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MISAPPRISING MISPRISION:
WHY MISPRISION OF A FELONY IS NOT A CRIME
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE
INTRODUCTION
Immigration is an area of American law in which archaic terminol-
ogy and hyper-technical statutory interpretation collide with human
lives. The results can be arbitrary, absurd, or tragic. Noncitizens’ be-
havior is scrutinized, categorized, and judged according to different
standards than those that citizens must meet or even consider, and the
consequences can be disproportionately devastating. One illustrative
example is the immigration law term “crime involving moral turpi-
tude” (CIMT). This antiquated term is not officially defined, nor does
any list of crimes definitively involving moral turpitude exist. There
are no “crimes involving moral turpitude” outside of immigration law,
so citizens never need to evaluate whether their behavior may or may
not be legally turpitudinous. Yet a noncitizen convicted of a CIMT can
face one of the most profoundly disruptive and traumatic events a per-
son can experience—deportation.
One CIMT that especially highlights the disparity of consequences
that citizens and noncitizens can face for the same behavior is mispri-
sion of a felony. Misprision of a felony is a federal misdemeanor pun-
ishable by a fine or up to three years in prison.1 The crime consists of
having knowledge of a felony committed by someone else, concealing
it, and not informing the authorities as soon as possible.2 Misprision is
little known, infrequently charged, and lightly punished—when com-
mitted by citizens. But when committed by a noncitizen, the crime
suddenly takes on the fearful aspect of a CIMT. This can result in
permanent banishment from the United States.
This Comment uses the disparity in the consequences of misprision
of a felony for citizens and noncitizens to illuminate the problem with
the CIMT category. It begins with a brief summary of the legal struc-
ture of immigration law in the United States. It then describes the
significance of the CIMT category and tracks the history and current
application of the crime of misprision of a felony. There is a current
circuit split regarding whether or not misprision of a felony is categori-
1. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
2. § 4.
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cally a CIMT and the various circuits’ arguments are explored, focus-
ing especially on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Robles-Urrea v.
Holder.3 Next, this Comment analyzes the immigration consequences
of a conviction of misprision of a felony, and shows the wide gulf be-
tween its impact on citizens and noncitizens. Finally, this Comment
goes on to argue that a ruling that misprision of a felony is not a
CIMT could function as a way towards a piecemeal dismantling of the
crimes involving moral turpitude category.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part will introduce the legal structure by which immigration is
governed and focus on the role that the concept of crimes involving
moral turpitude plays in immigration law. This Part will then intro-
duce the definition, history, and current application of the crime of
misprision of a felony. Finally, it will turn to the current circuit split
regarding whether or not misprision of a felony is a CIMT for immi-
gration purposes.
A. The Legal Structure of Immigration Law
Immigration law in the United States is primarily governed by the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and administered by the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS).4 DHS consists of three enti-
ties: two enforcement divisions—Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—and the division
responsible for adjudicating immigration benefits, U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS).5 Removal proceedings,6 however,
fall within the purview of the Department of Justice (DOJ)7 and are
conducted by an immigration judge appointed by the Attorney Gen-
eral.8 The approximately 350 immigration judges that make up the im-
migration court system work under the authority of the DOJ’s
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).9 Their decisions
3. See generally 678 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 2012).
4. MICHAEL A. SCAPERLANDA, IMMIGRATION LAW: A PRIMER 4 (2009).
5. Id.
6. The term “removal” replaced “deportation” as official immigration terminology in 1996. T.
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 251
(2016).
7. Id.
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012).
9. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW: AN AGENCY
GUIDE 1 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/eoir_an_agency_guide/download [herein-
after EOIR Agency Guide].
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can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).10 BIA
decisions can, in turn, be appealed (by the respondent only) to the
federal circuit court of appeals that has jurisdiction in the area.11
Although they can be appealed to the federal circuit courts of ap-
peal,12 BIA decisions are generally treated with a great deal of defer-
ence by reviewing bodies.13 Chevron deference14 means that very little
immigration law has come about as a result of precedential federal
court cases. The law overwhelmingly comes from the INA, as inter-
preted by the entities that make up DHS and the EOIR.15 Where im-
migration statutes are ambiguous or leave terms undefined, most
federal courts are very reluctant to impose an interpretation contrary
to that of the immigration judge or the BIA.16 However, when the
administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute is held as impermis-
sible by the reviewing federal circuit court of appeals, the circuit court
will state its contrary finding and remand for an opinion consistent
with the legal framework or mode of analysis it used to arrive at its
contrary judgment. The application of ambiguous terms or phrases in
immigration statutes can thus be entirely different depending on what
circuit court of appeals district has jurisdiction over a noncitizen’s
case. These variances in interpretation by district can endure for long
periods of time, as the Supreme Court is rarely called upon to resolve
these issues and is even more reluctant than the courts of appeal to
step in and unilaterally impose its own interpretation on the immigra-
tion courts and the BIA.
10. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b).
11. See EOIR AGENCY GUIDE, supra note 9, at 7.
12. In 2017, appeals of BIA decisions made up eighty-five percent of administrative agency
appeals, for a total of 5,210 cases. United States Courts, U.S. Courts of Appeals - Judicial Busi-
ness 2017, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-courts-appeals-judicial-business-2017;
United States Courts, U.S. Courts of Appeals—Sources of Appeals, Original Proceedings, and
Miscellaneous Applications Commenced, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Periods Ending Sep-
tember 30, 2013 through 2017, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b3_0930
.2017.pdf.
13. See SCAPERLANDA, supra note 4, at 20 (quoting Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d
1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2006)).
14. “Chevron deference,” referring to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), stands for the principal in administrative law that an administrative agency’s permissible
interpretation of a statute should be deferred to if Congress has not directly spoken on the issue
itself. Id. at 842–43.
15. See generally USCIS, Adjudicator’s Field Manual, Ch. 14: Sources of Information / Con-
ducting Research, §§ 14.3–14.6, https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/
0-0-0-2281.html#0-0-0-324 (last visited Oct. 24, 2019).
16. David Hausman, The Failure of Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PENN. L. REV. 1177, 1196
(2016).
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B. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude
One notoriously ambiguous term in immigration law is “crime in-
volving moral turpitude.” The original legal function of the term
“moral turpitude” was to standardize a test for slander allegations.17
Words would only rise to the level of slander if they implicated moral
turpitude, either by resulting in a conviction for a crime or by causing
such harm to the reputation of the slandered that the plaintiff would
not need to prove damages.18 The term and concept of “moral turpi-
tude,” at various times in American legal history, has been used in
evidence law, voting rights law, juror disqualification, and professional
licensing; but it is now almost exclusively used in immigration law.19
Between 2002 and 2012, the term “appeared in nearly 2,500 reported
federal cases . . . many involving immigration issues. These numbers
do not include administrative-agency decisions. . . . Yet, the term
‘moral turpitude’ itself is an antique . . . .”20
Conviction of a CIMT can result in a number of serious immigra-
tion consequences for a noncitizen. These consequences include re-
moval21 and being rendered ineligible for cancellation of removal.22
Yet the term, despite its grave implications and having been in use for
hundreds of years, has no precise definition—no list of crimes that
definitively constitute a CIMT for immigration purposes exists.23
While the term “moral turpitude” is undefined, courts commonly use
the following reference:
[T]he most common definition of “moral turpitude” cited by the
courts is “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society
in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and man.”24
A CIMT must not just be a crime technically, but also a crime that
somehow reads as inherently wrong, across legal systems and cultural
norms. USCIS claims that despite the lack of statutory definition,
“[e]xtensive case law . . . has provided sufficient guidance on whether
17. Julia Ann Simon-Kerr, Moral Turpitude, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1001, 1010 (2012).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1001.
20. Id. at 1002 n.12.
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2018).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2012).
23. Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 194–95 n.5 (1st Cir. 1994).
24. What Constitutes “Crime Involving Moral Turpitude” Within meaning of § 212(a)(9) and
241(a)(4) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1182Ma)(9), 1251(a)(4)), and Similar
Predecessor Statutes Providing for Exclusion or Deportation of Aliens Convicted of Such Crime,
23 A.L.R. FED. 480 § 3 (1975) [hereinafter 23 A.L.R. FED. 480 § 3].
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an offense rises to the level of a CIMT.”25 The agency further notes
that a CIMT must involve “conduct that shocks the public con-
science,”26 and that “[w]hether an offense is a CIMT is largely based
on whether the offense involves willful conduct that is morally repre-
hensible and intrinsically wrong, the essence of which is a reckless, evil
or malicious intent.”27
Some obvious examples of CIMTs spring to mind: murder is a clear
instance, as is rape. But despite USCIS’s assurance that sufficient gui-
dance exists, other CIMTs are not so immediately apparent. Among
these is the crime of misprision of a felony.
C. Misprision of a Felony
Misprision of a felony can be defined simply: knowing that a felony
was committed and failing to notify the authorities.28 The crime of
misprision of a felony is committed by “[w]hoever, having knowledge
of the actual commission of a felony . . . conceals and does not as soon
as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in
civil or military authority under the United States . . . .”29 Moral turpi-
tude is a concept with a long history in American law, but the crime of
misprision of a felony is much older still.
An article on misprision of a felony from 1974 begins: “[M]isprision
of felony might be considered an antiquated and nonexistent offense
. . . .”30 Misprision first entered the record in 1500s England,31 was
reported to have largely fallen out of use in 1866,32 and was officially
eliminated from English law in 1967.33 The American statute was en-
acted in 1790 and has not functionally changed since that time.34
Nearly every state has eliminated its misprision statute, if it had one,
and the crime has widely been considered a relic.35
25. USCIS, Policy Manual, Vol. 12, Pt. F, Ch. 5(A)(1), https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/
HTML/PolicyManual-Volume12-PartF-Chapter5.html (last updated Oct. 8, 2019).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
29. § 4.
30. Carl Wilson Mullis, III, Misprision of Felony: A Reappraisal, 23 EMORY L.J. 1095, 1095
(1974).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1096.
33. Id. at 1101.
34. Id.
35. See generally E. Lee Morgan, Misprision of Felony, 6 S.C.L.Q. 87 (1953); Michael Kelly,
Misprision of Felony Not a Crime in Florida, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 222 (1975); P. R. Glazebrook,
Misprision of Felony – Shadow or Phantom?, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 189 (1964).
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Despite this general impression, misprision of a felony continues to
be a federal crime, and people are still charged with misprision. In
non-immigration cases, one theory is that the charge remains in use as
a method of securing a plea deal.36 From 2002 to 2007, misprision of a
felony was the most serious charge against a defendant at the time of
the initial filing of the case in approximately 600 cases, but was the
most serious charge at the time of the termination of the case in over
2,300 instances.37 The author responsible for this theory posits that
“[t]he almost 1:4 ratio bespeaks the frequent utilization of misprision
of a felony as a pleading crime.”38 The author further notes that, of
those 600 cases in which misprision of a felony was the most serious
crime with which the defendant was initially charged, the defendant
pleaded guilty to misprision in “virtually all” of them, “suggesting a
pre-filing deal between the prosecution and defense.”39
The one area of law where the crime of misprision of a felony has
serious implications in and of itself, rather than as part of a plea ar-
rangement, is immigration law. According to the BIA, and in almost
all of the federal circuits, misprision of a felony constitutes a CIMT.
D. Circuit Split on the Question of Misprision
of a Felony as a CIMT
Misprision of a felony has been categorically considered a CIMT for
immigration purposes by the BIA, and the circuit courts that have re-
viewed the question have generally concurred, with the exception of
the Ninth Circuit.
1. Itani v. Ashcroft
In Itani v. Ashcroft, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a BIA finding
that the defendant’s misprision of a felony—in this case, his involve-
ment with a scheme to report rented cars stolen—constituted a CIMT
which rendered him deportable.40 Itani was a Lebanese citizen who
entered the United States in 1984 and was arrested in 1987 on charges
related to transportation of stolen automobiles.41 Itani pled guilty to
36. Kyle Graham, Criminal Codes as Ecosystems: The Curious Case of Misprision of a Felony
(Dec. 13, 2011), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/12/criminal-codes-as-ecosystems-
the-curious-case-of-misprision-of-a-felony.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20160605124328/
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/12/criminal-codes-as-ecosystems-the-curious-case-
of-misprision-of-a-felony.html].
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 298 F.3d 1213, 1214 (11th Cir. 2002).
41. Id.
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one count of misprision of a felony, and was sentenced to three years
in prison and a $25,000 fine.42 The trial court, however, suspended his
sentence and gave him three years of probation.43 Despite the leni-
ency shown by the district court, Itani received a notice from USCIS
several years later that charged him as deportable, based in part on his
having committed a CIMT within five years of entry.44 At his hearing,
the immigration judge ordered Itani deported, and in 2001—seven-
teen years after Itani’s crime took place—the BIA dismissed his ap-
peal.45 The BIA reasoned that “misprision of a felony is a crime
involving moral turpitude because it requires the affirmative, inten-
tional concealment of a known felony and has been condemned at
common law.”46
Itani appealed the BIA’s decision to the Eleventh Circuit, which
decided to uphold the BIA’s decision. In so ruling, the court relied on
the misprision statute’s long history, noting that “concealment of
crime and agreements to do so are not looked upon with favor. Such
conduct deserves no encomium.”47 The court also relied on a Supreme
Court decision which acknowledged misprision’s “archaic ring,” but
held nevertheless that reporting a crime is a “deeply rooted social
obligation.”48
2. Robles-Urrea v. Holder
The BIA decision in Matter of Robles-Urrea was reversed by the
Ninth Circuit in Robles-Urrea v. Holder.49 Robles-Urrea was a Mexi-
can citizen who pled guilty to misprision of a felony—in this case, a
conspiracy to distribute drugs that occurred over fifteen years prior to
his being charged—and served his nine month sentence, followed by a
year of supervised release.50 Afterwards, he left the United States.51
Upon his return, the DHS charged him as removable for having been
convicted of a CIMT.52 The immigration judge found him removable,
and the BIA dismissed his appeal, finding that the “affirmative steps”
taken to either conceal the felony or to prevent authorities from dis-
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1215.
46. Itani, 298 F.3d at 1215.
47. Id. at 1216 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696–97 (1972)).
48. Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557–58 (1980)).
49. Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2012).
50. Matter of Robles-Urrea, 24 I.&N. Dec. 22, 23 (BIA 2006).
51. Robles-Urrea, 678 F.3d at 706.
52. Id.
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covering it are what make misprision of a felony a CIMT.53 Robles-
Urrea filed a motion to reconsider, which the BIA granted in order to
double down.54 It overruled its previous decision, Matter of Sloan,
which had held that misprision of a felony was not a CIMT.55
Robles-Urrea appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The court found that
the BIA “entirely fail[ed] to explain why misprision of a felony is ‘in-
herently base, vile, or depraved.’”56 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged
that the BIA and the other circuit courts have found misprision to be
inherently turpitudinous because it involves lying and deceit. How-
ever, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that lying and deceit may not be fair
or just actions, but they are not so vile as to shock the conscience.57
The court held that it was a “‘realistic probability, not [just] a theoreti-
cal possibility’ that the misprision of a felony statute will encompass
conduct that is not morally turpitudinous.”58 For these reasons, the
Ninth Circuit declined to follow the other circuits and held that mis-
prision of a felony is not categorically a CIMT.
3. Lugo v. Holder
Given this range of opinions, in Lugo v. Holder, the Second Circuit
decided to abstain from throwing its hat in the ring. In a case involving
an appeal of a judgment holding misprision of a felony to be a CIMT,
the Second Circuit stated, “We believe it is desirable for the Board to
clarify this matter in a published opinion.”59 The court noted the exis-
tence of a split amongst the circuits on the question of whether mispri-
sion of a felony is a CIMT.60 The Second Circuit also pointed out that
the BIA itself originally held that misprision of a felony was not a
53. Id. The statute under which Robles-Urrea was charged, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I),
provides that “any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits commit-
ting acts which constitute the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude . . . or an
attempt or conspiracy to commit such crime, is inadmissible.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) states
that “[a]ny alien who at the time of entry . . . was within one or more of the classes of aliens
inadmissible . . . is deportable.” Since Robles-Urrea left the United States and re-entered, the
statutory provision regarding deportability on the basis of inadmissibility applied. However, 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) makes any alien deportable who is convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude within five years of admission to the United States, where a sentence of at least
one year may be imposed, so Robles-Urrea’s leaving and re-entering the country was not a
necessary condition of finding him removable.
54. Robles-Urrea, 678 F.3d at 706.
55. Id. at 706–07.
56. Id. at 708.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 711–12.
59. Lugo v. Holder, 783 F.3d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 2015).
60. Id. at 120.
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CIMT in Matter of Sloan.61 In Matter of Sloan, the BIA categorically
held that misprision is not a CIMT, relying on the fact that worse
crimes than “the mere failure to furnish information” do not involve
moral turpitude for the purposes of immigration law.62 However, in
Matter of Robles-Urrea, the BIA had changed its position to align with
the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Itani.63
4. Villegas-Sarabia v. Sessions
The BIA-Itani line of thought was echoed in the Fifth Circuit case
Villegas-Sarabia v. Sessions.64 Villegas-Sarabia was a Mexican citizen
who was brought to the United States by his mother and his U.S.-
citizen father when he was a few months old, and remained in the
United States continuously ever since.65 Unrelated complications in
immigration law caused Villegas-Sarabia’s citizenship to be unclear
for many years, but he became a lawful permanent resident when he
was eleven years old.66 Villegas-Sarabia was charged with possession
of a firearm by a felon in 2011, and he applied for citizenship in be-
tween his guilty plea and his sentencing.67 USCIS denied his applica-
tion and subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against him,
on the grounds that a 1997 conviction for misprision of a felony consti-
tuted a CIMT making him removable.68 The BIA affirmed the immi-
gration judge’s ruling.69
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit stated that it uses the categorical ap-
proach to analyze whether or not crimes fit the BIA definition of a
CIMT.70 The court explained that the categorical approach requires
the court to ignore the individual circumstances of the particular
crime at issue, instead determining whether the minimum criminal
conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute is pre-
sent.71 In Villegas-Sarabia, the court upheld the conclusion it had
reached in past cases—that misprision of a felony constitutes a CIMT
because it involves an element of intentional deception, and that in-
tentional deception inherently implicates moral turpitude.72
61. Matter of Sloan, 12 I.&N. Dec. 840, 848 (A.G. 1968, BIA 1966).
62. Id. at 842.
63. Matter of Robles-Urrea, 24 I.&N. Dec. 22, 26–27 (BIA 2006).
64. Villegas-Sarabia v. Sessions, 874 F.3d 871, 880–81 (5th Cir. 2017).
65. Id. at 874.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 875.
69. Id. at 875–76.
70. Villegas-Sarabia, 874 F.3d at 877.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 878.
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The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the circuit split, with Itani on one
side, the Ninth Circuit on the other, and the Second Circuit deciding
not to weigh in.73 The Fifth Circuit noted that it “has not expressly
adopted Itani, but some of our panels have cited it favorably,” ulti-
mately deciding that its history of favorable treatment of Itani was
strong enough to allow it to support the BIA’s interpretation.74
In a recent opinion issued by the BIA, Matter of Mendez, the BIA
reaffirmed its holding from Matter of Robles-Urrea, declaring its posi-
tion that misprision of a felony is categorically a CIMT.75
II. ANALYSIS
This Part will analyze misprision of a felony as a CIMT. This Part
will also examine the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Robles-Urrea, its rea-
soning and treatment of BIA and other circuit cases on the question.
It will also discuss its use of the categorical and modified categorical
approach. Next, this Part will examine other arguments in favor of
deciding that misprision of a felony is not a CIMT. Finally, this Part
argues against the crimes involving moral turpitude category as a
whole.
A. Misprision of a Felony Should Not be Categorized as a CIMT
Misprision of a felony should not be categorized as a CIMT, be-
cause it does not satisfy the generally agreed-upon elements of a crime
involving moral turpitude. It does not necessarily shock the con-
science, or indicate a level of “baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men.”76
Crimes that demonstrate a much greater rupture of our social norms,
such as assault and incest, are not categorized as crimes involving
moral turpitude.77 In Robles-Urrea v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit ac-
knowledged this and held that misprision of a felony is not categori-
cally a CIMT.78 For the reasons given in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion,
the crime’s relative obscurity, and the disproportionate severity of the
consequences to noncitizens, the existing circuit split should be re-
solved and misprision of a felony declared categorically not a CIMT.
73. Id. at 879–80.
74. Id. at 880–81.
75. Matter of Mendez, 27 I.&N. Dec. 219 (BIA 2018).
76. 23 A.L.R. FED. 480 § 3, supra note 24.
77. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL & HANDBOOK, 9 FAM 302.3-
2(B)(2)(U)(c)(3)(b)(i), (iii), https://fam.state.gov/searchapps/viewer?format=html&query=moral
%20turpitude&links=MORAL,TURPITUD&url=/FAM/09FAM/09FAM030203.html#M302_3_
2_B_2.
78. 678 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2012).
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B. The Ninth Circuit Court’s Reasoning in Robles-Urrea
1. The Categorical Approach and the Modified Categorical
Approach
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Robles-Urrea  used both the categori-
cal approach and the modified categorical approach to analyze
whether misprision of a felony is categorically a CIMT.79 The categor-
ical approach is when a court considers only the elements of the of-
fense, rather than the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime.80
It is designed to analyze whether the bare minimum of criminal con-
duct necessary to maintain a conviction under the statute would nec-
essarily make the accused removable, while ensuring that the statute is
not so broad that it encompasses conduct that the accused did not
necessarily perform.81 The categorical approach means that the facts
of the underlying criminal conviction do not need to be, and in fact
cannot be, re-litigated.82 The modified categorical approach allows im-
migration judges to examine the record below, and the noncitizen’s
actual conduct, to determine whether or not the noncitizen is remova-
ble on the basis of their conviction for a crime.83
In its categorical analysis, the Ninth Circuit set out to compare the
elements of Robles-Urrea’s crime with the generic definition of moral
turpitude.84 The categorical approach requires a reviewing court to
find a “realistic probability”85 that the statute is so broad that it will
sweep in conduct beyond the scope of the generic federal offense
before it can overturn an administrative decision.86 The court began
by stating that CIMTs are nowhere defined or listed, but are generally
considered by interpreting courts and the BIA to mean “crimes that
79. Id.
80. Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical
Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1674 (2011).
81. Id.
82. Brief for American Immigration Lawyers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Recon-
sideration at 4, Silva-Trevino, 24 I.&N. Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008) (No. A013 014 303).
83. Das, supra note 80, at 1674.
84. Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2012).
85. Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to
Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 282–84 (2012)
(There are two standards for analyzing the elements of a noncitizen’s conviction versus the ge-
neric federal offense: the “realistic probability” approach and the “least culpable conduct” ap-
proach. The realistic probability standard is more difficult for noncitizens to meet, but it is the
approach recommended for use in cases involving crimes of moral turpitude. Under the least
culpable conduct analysis, the court would simply ask whether the least culpable conduct that
could possibly have resulted in the noncitizen’s conviction necessarily involved morally turpi-
tudinous behavior.). For an explanation and analysis of the two approaches and the categorical
approach as a whole, see id.
86. Robles-Urrea, 678 F.3d at 707 (citing Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007)).
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are ‘inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted
rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in
general.’”87 The court noted that CIMTs tend to fall into two catego-
ries—crimes involving “grave acts of baseness or depravity,” and
crimes involving fraud.88 These categories necessarily leave many
crimes out. Not every crime, not even every serious crime, is a CIMT
just because it involves conduct contrary to society’s rules and norms.
The court pointed out that many crimes, including burglary and as-
sault with a deadly weapon, are not CIMTs—a crime involving moral
turpitude must go even further and “shock . . . the public con-
science.”89 The problem with the BIA’s categorical analysis, the Ninth
Circuit found, was that it simply concluded that misprision of a felony
met the criteria for a CIMT, without explaining how and why it came
to that conclusion.90
The BIA relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Itani to con-
clude that misprision of a felony is a CIMT, because it consists of be-
havior that “runs contrary to accepted social duties.”91 The Ninth
Circuit, however, pointed out the flaw of this line of reasoning by
quoting its opinion in Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, where it found that
the Itani rationale would mean that every crime is necessarily a
CIMT.92 All crimes involve some element of behavior that runs con-
trary to an accepted social duty, but not all of these behaviors have
the requisite elements of baseness or depravity that raise them to the
level of a CIMT.93 If Congress intended for any conviction for any
crime to render a noncitizen removable and ineligible for cancellation
of removal, there would be no need for the moral turpitude distinc-
tion. The Ninth Circuit analysis distinguished misprision of a felony
from similar crimes that have been held to be CIMTs, such as obstruc-
tion of justice and accessory after the fact, because misprision, unlike
those other crimes, does not require any particular intent but only
knowledge of the felony.94
Finally, the Ninth Circuit pointed out the absurdity of holding mis-
prision of a felony to be categorically a CIMT, when the felony con-
cealed by the defendant could carry less serious consequences than
87. Id. at 708 (quoting Matter of Robles-Urrea, 24 I.&N. Dec. 22, 25 (BIA 2006)).
88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2007)).
90. Id.
91. Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002).
92. Navarro-Lopez, 503 F.3d at 1070–71.
93. Id.
94. Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 710 (9th Cir. 2012).
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the defendant’s concealment of it.95 Because nothing in the misprision
of a felony statute as it is written necessarily implicates moral turpi-
tude in all cases, the court held that it is not categorically a CIMT.96
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the BIA with instructions
to conduct an analysis using the modified categorical approach.97
Since the modified categorical approach requires an evaluation of the
defendant’s actual conduct, rather than an evaluation of the statutory
elements of the offense, a modified categorical analysis is more prop-
erly conducted by a lower tribunal with access to more of the specific
facts.98 Nevertheless, the court maintained that it had “severe doubts”
as to whether the government could prevail under such analysis—if
misprision of a felony is not categorically a CIMT, the court found it
extremely unlikely that Robles-Urrea’s behavior in committing mis-
prision involved moral turpitude.
2. Misprision of a Felony as an Offense Involving Fraud
In a footnote to the Robles-Urrea opinion, the Ninth Circuit noted
that it did not touch upon the question of whether or not misprision of
a felony is an offense involving fraud, because the BIA had not ad-
vanced that theory in its opinion.99 Misprision of a felony is often un-
derstood to fall under the category of fraud, and it is this
understanding that justifies its categorization as a CIMT—at least,
that is what the Eleventh Circuit held in Itani.100 The rationale relied
on by the court in Itani—that misprision of a felony is a CIMT be-
cause it involves fraudulent conduct—is unpersuasive, because mispri-
sion does not necessarily require fraud as it is generally understood.
For instance, the FBI’s definition of fraud offenses does not capture
misprision of a felony. The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program
lists the following fraud offenses: false pretenses/swindle/confidence
game, credit card/automatic teller machine fraud, impersonation, wel-
fare fraud, wire fraud, identity theft, and hacking /computer inva-
sion.101 Misprision of a felony does not appear on this list. The
95. Id. at 710–11.
96. Id. at 711.
97. Id. at 712–13.
98. Id. at 712.
99. Id. at 711 n.8.
100. Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2002).
101. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE—FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTING PROGRAM, NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM, (NIBRS), 2017, Crimes
Against Persons, Property, and Society, https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/2017/resource-pages/crimes_ag
ainst_persons_property_and_society-2017.pdf (Released Fall 2018) [hereinafter Crimes Against
Persons, Property, and Society].
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database defines fraud offenses as the “intentional perversion of the
truth for the purpose of inducing another person, or other entity, in
reliance upon it to part with something of value or to surrender a legal
right.”102 Misprision does not contemplate that the misprisor has
failed to inform law enforcement of a felony for the purpose of induc-
ing reliance, or to cause someone to part with something of value or to
surrender any legal right. In fact, the purpose for the misprision is not
contemplated in the crime’s definition.103 So the fraudulent conduct
justification for misprision’s classification as a CIMT is unconvincing.
C. Possible Justifications for Misprision of a Felony
It is not difficult to imagine various reasons why someone may
choose to not reveal to law enforcement that they have knowledge of
a felony—fear of reprisal from known felons, fear of candor to offi-
cials due to immigration status, mistrust of law enforcement due to
experience with official corruption in the immigrant’s home country,
unwillingness to bring criminal or immigration consequences on a
friend or family member, unwillingness to incriminate (or seem to in-
criminate) oneself, and many more.
In 2000, Congress enacted the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Prevention Act, which provides a method for undocumented crime
victims to obtain legal status in the United States if they cooperate
with law enforcement.104 The legislation acknowledges that “because
victims are often illegal immigrants . . . they are repeatedly punished
more harshly” than offenders.105 The law goes on to note that because
noncitizen crime victims are:
[F]requently unfamiliar with the laws, cultures, and languages . . .
subjected to coercion and intimidation . . . and because they often
fear retribution and forcible removal to countries in which they will
face retribution or other hardship, these victims often find it diffi-
cult or impossible to report the crimes committed against them or to
assist in the investigation and prosecution of such crimes.106
102. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE—FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: UNIFORM CRIME RE-
PORTING PROGRAM, NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM, (NIBRS), 2017, NIBRS
Offense Definitions, 2017, 3, https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/2017/resource-pages/nibrs_offense_defini
tions-2017.pdf (Released Fall 2018) [hereinafter NIBRS Offense Definitions].
103. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (“Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make
known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United
States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.”).
104. See generally 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2012).
105. § 7101(b)(17).
106. § 7101(b)(20).
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Even direct victims of crimes find it difficult to cooperate with law
enforcement—noncitizens with mere knowledge of a felony have all
the disincentives to cooperation listed by Congress, with no hope of
an immigration benefit. Indeed, as U.S. lawmakers themselves
pointed out, a noncitizen who chooses to come forward will likely face
a harsher penalty than the felon.107
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Robles-Urrea is persuasive—mis-
prision of a felony is categorically not a CIMT, because the elements
of misprision of a felony do not necessarily implicate conduct that is
especially base, depraved, or shocking to the public conscience. In-
stead, the elements of misprision of a felony implicate conduct that is
not at all difficult to justify.
D. The Relative Obscurity of Misprision of a Felony
Citizens are very rarely charged with misprision of a felony. It is an
archaic crime that is not widely known. When misprision is mentioned
in scholarly works or articles, it is often described as little-known or
obscure.108 The elements of the crime have to be outlined in media for
both the general public and for legal professionals. Many articles writ-
ten for the general public that discuss misprision of a felony approach
the subject from the angle of a novelty or a warning—You yourself
may have committed this obscure crime you’ve never heard of! Here’s
how!109 Considering how rarely misprision of a felony is charged or
convicted, how unknown it is to the general public and even to legal
professionals, and how it is often described as a crime that anyone
may have committed without even knowing it, it is disingenuous to
claim that misprision of a felony suddenly implicates moral turpitude
when perpetrated by immigrants.
Charges of misprision of felony are rare, both because conduct en-
compassed in the definition of misprision of a felony can usually be
otherwise charged, and because misprision of a felony simply does not
107. See generally § 7101.
108. See, e.g., Mullis, III, supra note 30 (“While misprision of felony might be considered an
antiquated and nonexistent offense, a close examination of the crime and its history indicates
that this is not the case, for the crime still exists today.”); Royal G. Shannonhouse III, Misprision
of a Federal Felony: Dangerous Relic or Scourge of Malfeasance?, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 59, 60
(1974) (noting the crime’s “obsolescence” and that “it may shock many United States citizens to
learn that there is a law-imposed duty to inform the government of misconduct of one’s fellows
. . . .”).
109. See, e.g., Arlene Jones, Are you guilty of misprision of a felony?, AUSTIN WEEKLY NEWS,
https://www.austinweeklynews.com/News/Articles/4-6-2017/Are-you-guilty-of-misprision-of-a-
felony%3F-/ (Apr. 6, 2017); Van Smith, Obscure charge “misprision of a felony” adds to feds’
arsenal to fight “Stop Snitching,” BALTIMORE CITY PAPER, https://www.citypaper.com/bcp-cms-
1-1057900-migrated-story-cp-20101103-mobs-20101103-story.html (Nov. 3, 2010).
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shock the conscience, except in the most egregious cases. Arguments
have been made for modifying the statute to apply only to public
officials.110
Others have characterized misprision of a felony as a “pleading
crime.”111 Kyle Graham has characterized a “pleading crime” as a tool
that prosecutors use when they do not wish to, or are unable to,
charge a more substantive crime.112 This conception of misprision is
backed up by data indicating that misprision is rarely the most serious
crime with which a defendant is charged at the initial time of filing,
but is much more frequently the most serious charge by the end of the
case.113 In keeping with other media mentions of misprision, the arti-
cle refers to it as a “humble crime” that “doesn’t get much
attention.”114
Statistics on misprision of a felony are not available on most
databases maintained by the United States government or by state
governments. The lack of statistics speaks for itself, demonstrating
how rarely this crime is charged and how little importance is placed on
it. The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program—National Incident-
Based Reporting System does not catalog misprision of felony.115
Given the obscurity of the crime of misprision of a felony, the rarity
with which it is charged, the perception of misprision as a “pleading
crime,” and the lack of statistics the government keeps relating to it, it
is counter-intuitive to claim that this crime somehow shocks the public
conscience with its base depravity when it is committed by nonci-
tizens. Misprision of a felony, as it pertains to citizens, is discussed by
scholars as an archaic crime whose continued existence is a surprise.
Misprision of a felony, as it pertains to noncitizens, is categorized as a
crime involving “inherently base, vile, and depraved” behavior. This
gulf between interpretations is so wide that it is the disparity itself that
shocks the conscience.
E. The Disproportionate Consequences of Misprision
of a Felony for Noncitizens
The consequences of being charged with or convicted of a CIMT
are very severe for a noncitizen. These consequences can mean being
110. See Mullis, III, supra note 30, at 1114–15.
111. Graham, supra note 36.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Crimes Against Persons, Property, and Society, supra note 101; see also NIBRS Of-
fense Definitions supra note 102.
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deported.116 They could also mean that a lawful permanent resident
who attempts to adjust status and become a citizen faces a denial of
their application for naturalization.117 Additionally, the current ad-
ministration has ramped up the consequences of the denial of an N-
400 application.118 If an application to naturalize is denied on the
grounds of good moral character, USCIS has stated that it will issue a
Notice to Appear (NTA), which is a charging document issued by the
government to a citizen it intends to deport.119 CIMTs will implicate
the good moral character of a noncitizen.
If a noncitizen with a conviction, charge, or even uncharged history
of misprision of a felony visits an immigration attorney to discuss nat-
uralization, a competent attorney must advise that their attempt to
become a citizen could lead to the issuance of a NTA, and thus could
lead to their deportation. In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court
recognized that an attorney’s failure to adequately apprise his client of
the immigration consequences of a guilty plea amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel—a violation of his noncitizen client’s Sixth
Amendment rights.120 In the wake of that decision, all attorneys who
work with noncitizens are even more assiduous in warning clients of
the potential immigration consequences of any decision they might
make. With this knowledge, the noncitizen may elect not to take the
risk of applying to naturalize, despite fulfilling the requirements of
residency and having maintained legal status. In this way, the categori-
zation of misprision of a felony as a CIMT could lead to people—who
are otherwise entirely eligible for United States citizenship—not be-
coming citizens. These people are forced instead to live in a perma-
nent limbo that could end in deportation at any time.
Deportation is a very serious consequence. Despite the fact that it is
not a criminal punishment, but a civil procedure, many judges and
legal scholars have pointed out that the American legal system’s insis-
tence that it is not a punishment is disingenuous as well. In several
Supreme Court cases, Justices have declared in both majority and dis-
senting opinions that deportation is an extremely serious consequence
and that to be casual about deportation is a grave mistake. Indeed, the
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
117. Instructions for Application for Naturalization, USCIS Form N-400, 1 (2016).
118. Id.
119. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, USCIS POLICY MANUAL, Updated Guidance for
the Referral of Cases and Issuance of Notices to Appear (NTAs) in Cases Involving Inadmissible
and Deportable Aliens, PM-602-0050.1, 7 (June 28, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/
files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-28-PM-602-0050.1-Guidance-for-Referral-of-Cases-
and-Issuance-of-NTA.pdf.
120. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373–74 (2010).
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President of the National Association of Immigration Judges has ac-
knowledged that immigration cases are “complex and high stakes mat-
ters . . . which can be tantamount to death penalty cases . . .
adjudicated in a setting which most closely resembles traffic court.”121
F. Supreme Court Arguments for Fairness to Noncitizens
In the recent Supreme Court decision Padilla v. Kentucky, Justice
John Paul Stevens wrote that “as a matter of federal law, deportation
is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of
the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead
guilty to specified crimes.”122 The Court found that the increase in
crimes that can lead to deportation and the decrease in discretion that
immigration judges can exercise during or after sentencing, have “dra-
matically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction.”123
Justice Stevens noted that deportation has long been recognized as a
“particularly severe ‘penalty,’” citing the landmark immigration case
Fong Yue Ting v. United States.124 In Padilla, the Court held that law-
yers must inform their clients when their pleas carry a risk of deporta-
tion or violate the Sixth Amendment.125 This holding acknowledges
the severity of deportation as a criminal consequence for a noncitizen.
It makes it clear that in the Court’s opinion, nothing that could poten-
tially lead to deportation should be taken lightly.
121. Memorandum from Dana Leigh Marks, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges 2
(Oct. 2009), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/NAIJ%20Priorities%20Short%20List%20-%20
October%202009.pdf.
122. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364.
123. Id. at 356, 364.
124. Id. at 365 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 741 (1893)). In Fong Yue
Ting, the Supreme Court upheld a law requiring Chinese laborers who could not produce a
certificate of residence to provide two white—not Chinese—witnesses who could attest to their
residence. 149 U.S. at 729. The majority opinion in that case stated clearly that “deportation is
not punishment for crime. It is not a banishment . . . .” Id. at 730. Justice Stevens’ reference to
Fong Yue Ting in Padilla seems to function as a repudiation of the Court’s history of upholding
laws that disadvantage noncitizens, as well as a reference to Justice Murphy’s apt and modern-
sounding dissent:
It needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that deportation is punish-
ment. Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from home, and family, and
friends, and business, and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land, is pun-
ishment; and that oftentimes most severe and cruel.
Id. at 740. Justice Field’s dissent likewise acknowledges deportation as punishment “beyond all
reason in its severity. It is all out of proportion to the alleged offence.” Id. at 759. These dissents
are mirrored Justice Steven’s opinion, which reflects on deportation’s status as a punishment for
crime that is not, technically, criminal punishment.
125. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374; Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 2012) (quot-
ing Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007)).
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Supreme Court cases have long acknowledged the severity of de-
portation. In Justice Robert H. Jackson’s dissent in Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, he defended affording due process to
noncitizens by acknowledging that, while the law may place more re-
strictions on noncitizens, “basic fairness” should still apply and treat-
ment of the noncitizen and the citizen should be essentially
comparable in terms of fairness.126 In discussing due process violations
as they pertained to a noncitizen, he wrote:
If the procedures used to judge this alien are fair and just, no good
reason can be given why they should not be extended to . . . citizens.
If they would be unfair to citizens, we cannot defend the fairness of
them when applied to the more helpless and handicapped alien.127
Justice Jackson’s argument for affording procedural due process to
noncitizens who have been admitted to the United States, especially
to lawful permanent residents, is a compelling argument for fairness in
immigration law in general. He advocates for treatment of noncitizens
that is not precisely equal to that of citizens, but equitable. This argu-
ment is not an exact parallel for the differences in consequences of
misprision of a felony between citizens and noncitizens—the conse-
quences cannot be compared, because citizens cannot be deported.
And while it is rarely charged, and rarely has grievous consequences
on its own, misprision of a felony is still a federal crime regardless of
who commits it. But the principles Justice Jackson advocated for still
apply. If misprision of a felony is not regarded as morally turpitudi-
nous when committed by a citizen, it is fundamentally unfair to cate-
gorize it as a CIMT when applied to noncitizens.
However, in Justice William Douglas’s dissenting opinion in Harisi-
ades v. Shaughnessy, he challenged the failure to characterize deporta-
tion as a punishment. He described it as “punishment through
banishment from the country,”128 and wrote that
Banishment is punishment in the practical sense. It may deprive a
man and his family of all that makes life worth while. Those who
have their roots here have an important stake in this country. Their
plans for themselves and their hopes for their children all depend on
their right to stay. If they are uprooted and sent to lands no longer
known to them, no longer hospitable, they become displaced, home-
less people condemned to bitterness and despair.129
Given the severity of these consequences, Justice Douglas argued that
none of the civil rights that noncitizens enjoy in the United States can
126. 345 U.S. 206, 225 (1953).
127. Id.
128. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 598 (1952).
129. Id. at 600.
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be properly enjoyed if the threat of being deported arbitrarily hangs
over their heads. “Unless they are free from arbitrary banishment the
‘liberty’ they enjoy while they live here is indeed illusory.”130 That
misprision of a felony should carry such a heavy punishment for
noncitizens, to the extent that Supreme Court Justices have found it to
impede their enjoyment of their civil rights, is out of proportion to the
crime.
G. The Likelihood of Deportation
Additionally, an immigrant cannot rely on the hope that an immi-
gration judge will simply recognize that their conduct was not, in fact,
shocking to the conscience and decline to order them deported. Most
proceedings before immigration judges result in deportation.131 In
2017, almost 75% of cases in immigration courts resulted in removal
or “voluntary departure,” with relief being granted in only 13% of
cases.132 Furthermore, an immigration judge’s hands are tied in many
respects. Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions (JRAD) was
formerly a method by which immigration judges could exercise discre-
tion in deciding whether or not to uphold a noncitizen’s order of re-
moval.133 Now, however, JRAD no longer exists.134 Thus, deportation
is an almost foregone conclusion.
A noncitizen with a charge or conviction of misprision of a felony is
very likely to face deportation, or live with the threat of deportation,
because of its categorization as a CIMT. This categorization also
makes noncitizens ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal.135
130. Id.
131. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW: STATISTICS
YEARBOOK FISCAL YEAR 2017, 14, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1107056/download.
132. Id.
133. See former Immigration and Nationality Act § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994) (repealed
Sept. 30, 1996) (The INA formerly allowed for Immigration Judges to balance the positive and
negative equities and come to an independent conclusion regarding the deportation of a
noncitizen.).
134. Id. The Supreme Court provided a concise history in Padilla v. Kentucky:
[T]he JRAD procedure is no longer part of our law. Congress first circumscribed the
JRAD provision in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and in 1990 Con-
gress entirely eliminated it. In 1996, Congress also eliminated the Attorney General’s
authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation, an authority that had been
exercised to prevent the deportation of over 10,000 noncitizens during the 5-year pe-
riod prior to 1996.
559 U.S. 356, 363 (2010) (citations omitted); Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 705 (9th Cir.
2012) (quoting Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2007)).
135. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (2008) provides that a noncitizen’s continuous residence in the
United States—a condition of eligibility to apply for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(a)—is terminated when a noncitizen has committed an offense that renders him inad-
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The severity of these consequences is grossly disproportionate to the
crime of misprision of a felony, and grossly disproportionate to the
obscurity and unimportance of the crime in American law. To elimi-
nate its designation as a CIMT would bring the consequences of a
noncitizen’s conviction of misprision of a felony into proportion with
public perception of the crime and with the insignificant place it holds
in American law generally.
H. Ultimately the CIMT Category Should be Taken Out of the
Analysis of Immigration Decisions
The classification “crimes involving moral turpitude” should be
made less important in immigration law, because it is vague, archaic,
and not useful. It sweeps crimes such as petty shoplifting and turnstile
jumping136 into the same category, with the same consequences, as
crimes such as murder and rape. A wholesale disavowing of the cate-
gory is unlikely. However, certain crimes that do not at all satisfy the
generally accepted parameters of moral turpitude, such as misprision
of a felony, could be categorically ruled not to be CIMTs. Enough of
these rulings, taken together, could function as a piecemeal disman-
tling of the category.
Given the lack of clarity in the CIMT category, many have ques-
tioned whether it is unconstitutionally vague.137 The category survived
a “void for vagueness” challenge before the Supreme Court in 1951.138
In Jordan v. De George, the Supreme Court held that the defendant,
who had been convicted of tax fraud, should have been on notice that
his crime would constitute a CIMT because the case law on fraud had
been unambiguous—“[t]he phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’
has without exception been construed to embrace fraudulent con-
duct.”139 The test, the Court held, is not whether a statute meets “im-
possible standards of specificity . . . ,”140 but “whether the language
conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practices.”141 Since
missible or deportable. A conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude makes a noncitizen
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) and deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).
136. Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 674 (2015).
137. See, e.g., Mary Holper, Deportation for a Sin: Why Moral Turpitude is Void for Vague-
ness, 90 NEBRASKA L. REV. 647, 648 (2012); Sara Salem, Should They Stay or Should They Go:
Rethinking the Use of Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude in Immigration Law, 70 FLA. L. REV.
225, 250 (2018).
138. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 222, 231 (1951).
139. Id. at 232.
140. Id. at 231 (citing Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)).
141. Id. at 231–32 (citing United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947)).
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tax fraud was consistently categorized as a CIMT, the Court declined
to pursue the matter further—holding that the implications of the de-
fendant’s conduct should have been clear in this instance, “[w]hatever
else the phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ may mean in periph-
eral cases[.]”142
Justices Jackson, joined by Justices Hugo Black and Felix Frank-
furter, dissented, reasoning that deportation is so grave a punishment
that imposing it on the basis of so vague a phrase as “crime involving
moral turpitude” cannot be constitutional.143 The absolute lack of any
settled definition of moral turpitude clearly frustrated the dissenters.
They agreed with the defendant that the legislative history indicated
that Congress only had crimes of violence in mind when originally
enacting the statute.144 The dissent continued that any attempt to dis-
cern the “common understanding and practices” of the entire United
States would be impossible, and that deportation of a longtime lawful
permanent resident on the basis of such a flimsy construction would
be “a savage penalty” and that “due process of law requires standards
for imposing it as definite and certain as those for conviction of
crime.”145
Despite this persuasive reasoning, the Supreme Court has not revis-
ited the issue and the CIMT category survives today, just as vague as
ever.146 If it cannot be defeated, perhaps it could be worked around.
The category of CIMTs could be dismantled bit by bit, in piecemeal
challenges to its various provisions. This could be done until the trend
is obvious and Congress takes action to dismantle the category of its
own accord, or until it has lain dormant so long that no one seriously
thinks of charging or prosecuting someone using it as a rationale.
III. IMPACT
This Part examines the potential impact of declaring misprision of a
felony not to be a CIMT. It also discusses how that step might play a
larger role in United States immigration law in general by functioning
as a step towards dismantling the crimes involving moral turpitude
category. The Comment concludes by examining the impact this ac-
tion would have on noncitizens’ lives.
142. Id. at 232; 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2012).
143. Id. at 232–33.
144. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 235.
145. Id. at 243.
146. But cf. Derrick Moore, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude: Why the Void-for-Vagueness
Argument is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INTL. L. J. 813 (2008) (arguing that the
Jordan decision has not foreclosed a void-for-vagueness argument and that the Supreme Court
should revisit its decision).
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A. A Step Towards Dismantling CIMTs
If the circuit split was resolved in favor of the Ninth Circuit’s inter-
pretation of misprision of a felony as categorically not a CIMT, it
could function as the first step in dismantling the outdated, unclear,
unfair, oft-derided CIMT designation altogether. If the BIA were to
reverse its opinion and issue a precedential ruling that misprision of a
felony is categorically not a CIMT, or if the Supreme Court were to
take the (unlikely) step of resolving the circuit split, it would not only
be the correct analysis of misprision of a felony for the reasons out-
lined above, but it would further weaken the outdated CIMT
category.
While Congress could pass legislation amending the INA to remove
the CIMT designation from the statute, this seems wildly unlikely. Im-
migration law reform has always had difficulty gaining support or
passing in Congress. The last comprehensive reform to the INA was
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996,147 and that Act seriously increased deportations and other pun-
ishments for noncitizens.148 Furthermore, the Trump administration is
committed to increasing deportations.149 The chances that any Con-
gress, much less a legislature acting during the Trump administration,
will take the initiative to propose rewriting and revising a section of
the INA seems incredibly unlikely, especially in order to do away with
a large portion of criminal penalties for immigrants.150 Congress
would be dismantling one of the oldest and broadest categories of be-
havior that renders an immigrant inadmissible or deportable, and es-
sentially agreeing to legitimize large swathes of noncitizen conduct. In
2019 President Donald Trump declared a national emergency in order
to build a wall between the United States and Mexico. It was designed
to both curb immigration and send a message of exclusion to nonci-
147. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
148. See generally Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, tit. II.
149. See e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (announcing expanded
immigration enforcement priorities).
150. See Cade, supra note 136, at 719 (“Year after year—for over a decade now—multiple
bipartisan efforts to engineer comprehensive immigration reform have failed.”); see also 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1229b(a), 1229b(d)(1) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2018). See
generally Ryan Lizza, Getting to Maybe: Inside the Gang of Eight’s Immigration Deal, NEW
YORKER (June 24, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/06/24/getting-to-maybe;
Marc R. Rosenblum, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY SINCE 9/11: UNDERSTANDING THE STALEMATE
OVER COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., Aug. 2011, at 12.
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tizens,151 and so it is difficult to imagine legislative action softening or
eliminating the crimes against moral turpitude category.
B. Allowing CIMTs to Fade Away
If crimes were regularly adjudicated not to be CIMTs and the legiti-
macy of the category was continually called into question, it is possible
that in time, a pattern could emerge. CIMTs could cease to carry such
serious weight in immigration practice, even if they remained on the
books in immigration law as a part of the INA. Since the INA does
not define crimes involving moral turpitude, no crimes are statutorily
CIMTs. Should enough crimes be declared categorically not CIMTs,
the phrase could remain part of the INA as a sort of relic, without the
serious consequences it carries today.
There are other crimes that were formerly deemed CIMTs that are
no longer regularly prosecuted as such.152 One such example is homo-
sexuality and the crimes that were used to prosecute it.153 In 1990,
Congress revised the INA to remove “affliction with a psychopathic
personality . . . or sexual deviation” as a ground of exclusion or depor-
tation.154 Former criminal consequences of homosexuality, and how
the prosecution and designation of that “crime” has changed along
with society, could provide a template for how to gradually take the
teeth out of crimes involving moral turpitude.
In 1956, a lawful permanent resident who had been convicted of
“gross indecency” with another man in Toronto was ordered deported
for having committed a CIMT.155 The BIA noted that, like CIMTs,
the Canadian statute under which he was convicted did not anywhere
define “gross indecency,” so it initially overturned the immigration
judge’s deportation order.156 However, on reconsideration, the BIA
came to agree with the government’s conclusion that any set of facts
involving gross indecency between two men would necessarily have to
have involved moral turpitude, stating that they failed to find any
cases in which a conviction under that statute did not implicate facts
that necessarily involved moral turpitude.157 In 1959, the BIA stated
151. See Peter Baker, Trump Calls Emergency, Defying Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2019,
at A1.
152. See e.g., Shannon Minter, Sodomy and Public Morality Offenses Under U.S. Immigration
Law: Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 771, 771 (1993) (citing Immi-
gration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Matter of H., 7 I.&N. Dec. 359, 359–60 (BIA 1956).
156. Id. at 360.
157. Id. at 361.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-1\DPL105.txt unknown Seq: 25  5-FEB-20 12:14
2019] MISPRISON AS MORAL TURPITUDE 167
even more clearly that a noncitizen was deportable on the basis of
homosexuality alone.158 The lawful permanent resident defendant in
that case had been convicted of gross indecency and sodomy after
having made a homosexual overture to an undercover police of-
ficer.159 The Board found that “[t]here is no question that crimes of
gross indecency between male persons and sodomy are crimes involv-
ing moral turpitude by the language of the Michigan statutes, and the
decisions of this Board, and under such court decisions as are availa-
ble.”160 The man was found deportable.161
There has never been a list of crimes or behaviors fitting the crimes
involving moral turpitude standard, so theoretically, the BIA could
issue similar rulings today. As Shannon Minter pointed out in 1993:
The 1990 Act did not . . . explicitly provide new guidelines or stan-
dards about how to interpret or apply the crimes involving moral
turpitude exclusion . . . . As before the 1990 Act, the INS [Immigra-
tion and Nationality Service] and the courts retain nearly unfettered
discretion as to how to interpret these provisions. As a result, al-
though U.S. immigration law no longer explicitly discriminates on
the basis of lesbian or gay identity alone, the INS and the courts
have not reevaluated their old policy of interpreting these provi-
sions in a manner that singles out lesbians and gay men for dispa-
rate treatment.162
However, while immigration judges could continue to interpret the
CIMT category to include charges based solely on homosexuality, so-
ciety has changed. Sodomy laws have been struck down by the Su-
preme Court as unconstitutional.163 Some other countries still have
sodomy laws; some American laws that were used in the past to prose-
cute homosexual conduct, such as public lewdness and solicitation
statutes, remain on the books.164 But today, noncitizens are rarely
found deportable for having committed CIMTs when those crimes
merely implicate homosexual behavior.
Thus, the courts could still categorize certain crimes, such as a con-
viction of sodomy in a foreign country, or a conviction for public lewd-
ness or solicitation based on homosexual conduct, as implicating
moral turpitude. But because homosexuality does not, generally
speaking, shock the public conscience anymore, deportations are
rarely now sought on that basis. Because the American public does
158. Matter of S., 8 I.&N. Dec. 409 (BIA 1959).
159. Id. at 410.
160. Id. at 415.
161. Id. at 418.
162. Minter, supra note 152, at 782–83.
163. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 587 (2003).
164. See Minter, supra note 152, at 803–06.
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not generally think of homosexuality as inherently base, vile, or de-
praved, American courts do not seek to make it fit into the category
of CIMTs, subjecting noncitizens to deportation or inadmissibility on
those grounds alone.
This evolution could provide a template for other CIMTs. As
crimes cease to shock the public conscience, they should cease to be
prosecuted as CIMTs. If a noncitizen’s crime fits into some other cate-
gory that would render him deportable or excludable, such as the
broad immigration category called “aggravated felony,” then there is
no issue. And if the only basis for deportation or exclusion is a crime
that does not imply inherently base, vile, or depraved behavior, then
the solution should not be to somehow seek to make it fit into the
category of crimes involving moral turpitude, but to simply not deport
or exclude that person. As fewer and fewer deportations are sought
based on the CIMT category, the category will necessarily lose its
power and importance in immigration law, even if it remains part of
the INA.
C. Impact on Noncitizens’ Lives
Aside from the possible large-scale impact of helping to eliminate
the CIMT category, resolving the current circuit split in favor of the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of misprision would be an improvement
in the lives of individual immigrants. A resolution of the circuit split
will bring clarity, fairness, and equality of treatment regardless of
where the immigrant lives.
The impact of the current circuit split is that noncitizens are treated
differently depending on where they are located in the United States.
It is not a minor difference, but the difference between the same con-
duct being designated a CIMT and designated an archaic crime that is
rarely ever charged anymore. It can be the difference between being
adjudged inadmissible or deportable or being able to remain in the
United States. It can mean the difference between successfully peti-
tioning to cancel an order of deportation or having no recourse. It can
also mean the difference between applying to become a United States
citizen or having to choose to remain a permanent noncitizen, forever
out of reach of the full privileges, benefits, and responsibilities of citi-
zenship in a country that some may have lived in for decades.
In In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, the BIA held that a conviction for mis-
prision of a felony does not constitute a conviction for an aggravated
felony as an “offense relating to obstruction of justice.”165 The defen-
165. Matter of Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I.&N. Dec. 889 (BIA 1999).
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dant in Espinoza-Gonzalez was convicted of misprision of a felony
based on a conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute.166
He was afterwards placed in removal proceedings with that conviction
as the basis—the Immigration and Nationality Service charged him
with removability as an “alien convicted of an aggravated felony”
based on § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA.167 The INA’s definition of an
aggravated felony is a long list of offenses ranging from murder to
mutilation of a passport, as long as the term of imprisonment is at
least one year.168 With the BIA’s decision in Espinoza-Gonzalez, mis-
prision of a felony can no longer be classified as an aggravated felony
and make a noncitizen removable and ineligible for cancellation of
removal on that ground. Thus, classifying misprision as a CIMT is the
only remaining method by which misprision of a felony can make a
noncitizen removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal, in the
absence of any other removable offenses. If misprision of a felony is
held to categorically not be a CIMT, then noncitizens with convictions
for misprision will no longer be subject to deportation on the basis of
that conduct alone.
A publication by a division of the American Psychological Associa-
tion reported on the deportation’s effects.169 This report noted that
“[m]ost people who are deported have lived in the country for over a
decade and many are parents or caregivers of United States citi-
zens.”170 The report details the hardships that families in family deten-
tion centers are fleeing and the conditions to which they are forced to
return, noting that “deportations have resulted in kidnapping, torture,
rape, and murder.”171 In addition to violence, deportation separates
families, leading to fractured relationships and childhood trauma.172
The report also shows the wide-ranging effects that deportations can
have. “Nearly ten percent of United States families with children have
at least one member without citizenship, and 5.9 million United States
citizen children have at least one caregiver who does not have authori-
zation to remain in the United States.”173 Given the effects of depor-
tation of a family member on children—which include economic,
166. Id.
167. Id. at 890.
168. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U) (2012).
169. See generally Regina Day Langhout et al., Statement on the Effects of Deportation and
Forced Separation on Immigrants, Their Families, and Communities, 62 AM. J. COMM. PSYCH. 3
(2018).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 3–4.
172. Id. at 4.
173. Id.
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psychological, emotional, cognitive, and behavioral issues—this enor-
mous number of potentially affected children means that deportation
is an issue that affects the future of the United States generally.174
This is especially true considering that studies have shown that the
effects on children remain for some time even if a family is re-
united.175 With such serious consequences, deportations must not oc-
cur as a result of arbitrary, unfair, or unnecessary laws.
CONCLUSION
The more that American laws and standards for noncitizens reflect
the standards that we expect of citizens, the greater the integrity of the
American immigration system, and the more reasonable it is to expect
noncitizens to comply with American immigration laws. When what is
required and expected of noncitizens is not arbitrary, but instead re-
flects clear and legitimate expectations, with clear and legitimate con-
sequences of violations, both citizens and noncitizens alike can place
greater faith in immigration laws and find more value in upholding
and enforcing them.
Misprision of a felony should categorically not be a CIMT. Whether
this happens by a BIA ruling overturning its decision, by a majority of
the other circuit courts following the decision made by the Ninth Cir-
cuit, or by a Supreme Court decision, a declaration that misprision of
a felony is not a CIMT will greatly impact the fairness and equity of
United States immigration law. Misprision of a felony’s treatment in
non-immigration law makes clear that it is not a CIMT and it should
not be arbitrarily a CIMT when committed by a noncitizen, when the
disparity of consequences is so great. Additionally, a ruling that mis-
prision of a felony is not a CIMT will help take the teeth out of the
CIMT category, which should be done away with because it is vague,
archaic176, unnecessary, and perpetuates unfairness. A decision that
misprision of a felony is not a crime involving moral turpitude will be
a step towards improving American immigration law’s logic and
application.
Alexandra Carl
174. Id.
175. Langhout et al., supra note 169.
176. One measure of the term’s antiquity: Microsoft Word does not recognize “turpitudinous”
as correctly spelled. Microsoft Word for Mac 2017, Version 15.37.
